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PREEMPTING UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
A. A. SOMMER, JR.*
There is something called the “Law of Unintended Consequences.”  Who
enacted this law, who enforces it, and its exact scope are obscure.  However,
from time to time it manifests itself, most recently having made an appearance
in some of the fallout from the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
19951 (“the Act”).  One unintended or, perhaps more accurately, unforeseen
consequence of the Act has been the increasing appearance of the Milberg,
Weiss firm as plaintiffs’ counsel in securities class action litigation.2  This firm,
seen by many advocates of reform as the incarnation of all they dislike in class
litigation, has become an ever more commanding presence on that scene.  Mil-
berg, Weiss has extraordinarily competent and experienced lawyers in class ac-
tion litigation who have been extremely successful in securing substantial ver-
dicts and procuring huge settlements.  Their increased ascendancy and
heightened visibility in the class action arena cannot be a source of joy to the
promoters of the Act.  The reason for the firm’s rise is very simple:  One conse-
quence of the Act has been the lengthening of proceedings.  Milberg, Weiss,
with its deep pockets and vast experience, is better able than most other
smaller plaintiffs’ firms to sustain this lengthy process without suffering crip-
pling financial strain.
Another unintended consequence of the Act was the initial migration of se-
curities litigation to the state courts.3  Most states do not have laws that impose
the stringent pleading requirements of the Act, set the hurdles so high in pre-
vailing on fraudulent forecasts, provide for separate and proportionate dam-
ages,4 or place other impediments in the path of success in class actions like
those created by the Act.  While there initially appeared to be a major move
toward state courts, this trend subsequently abated, and at the present writing
the pendulum has swung back toward the federal system, both as a proportion
of total litigation and in absolute numbers.  Not surprisingly, most of the state
litigation was initiated in California, largely as a consequence of the fact that
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the principal targets of such litigation were technology-oriented companies,
many of which are located in Silicon Valley.5  Currently, in the California Su-
preme Court, a case is pending in which the defendants have asserted that suits
in California courts can reach only transactions that occurred in California, an
assertion which if adopted by the court obviously would impede the ability to
maintain a nationwide class action in the California courts and thus would
make California a much less attractive forum.6
As a consequence of the initial migration of litigation to the state courts and
a fear that it might recur, many of the original advocates of the Act agitated for
preemptive legislation that would preclude the maintenance of securities fraud
class actions in state courts.  H.R. 16537 and H.R. 1689,8 introduced in the
House, and S. 1260,9 introduced in the Senate, would achieve this.  Although
they differ as to the details, the thrust of these bills is the same—forcing all se-
curities class actions into federal court, thus subjecting such litigation to the
constraints of the Act.  The interest in the legislation is huge: H.R. 1689 has 224
co-sponsors; its Senate counterpart has forty co-sponsors.
Critics of this proposed federal legislation quickly emerged.  The Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was one early and vocal critic.  In testify-
ing before the Senate Sub-Committee on Securities on October 29, 1997,10 the
SEC sounded several cautions.  First, it said that experience under the Act had
been so limited that Congress should not leap to conclusions about its conse-
quences, including the likelihood of the continued popularity of state courts.11
Second, the SEC was concerned that by providing for exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion, investors might be deprived of “important protections,” which they are
denied under federal law, such as aiding and abetting civil liability and longer
statutes of limitations.12  Finally, the SEC was concerned that the benefits
flowing from the ability of corporations and shareholders to secure quick relief
in state courts, particularly the Delaware courts, might be lost in connection
with tender offers, proxy contests, and other financial transactions.13  However,
the SEC noted that S. 1260 would preserve a number of actions, such as cases
against brokers, actions involving localized fraud, claims involving fraud in
penny stocks and microcap securities, and actions by state regulators.14  The
SEC also noted that even if the Senate legislation was adopted it would not
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necessarily preclude the use of the state courts in an individual action to secure
discovery otherwise barred in a federal class action.15  Furthermore, the SEC
noted that the bill might discourage institutional investors from seeking to be
named as lead plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions because this would pre-
vent them from bringing related state claims unless they opted out of the plain-
tiff class.16
Notwithstanding these misgivings, the SEC has now endorsed the legisla-
tion, apparently because the Senate Banking Committee agreed to put into the
legislative history of S. 1260 an assurance that when Congress adopted the Act
it did not intend to do away with the “recklessness” standard for liability under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Several district court cases have con-
strued the Act as requiring conscious misconduct.17  The SEC has been ex-
tremely concerned lest this might become the accepted standard.  Hence it was
apparently willing to put aside its earlier misgivings about preemption to assure
the viability of recklessness as a basis for civil liability.  The Senate committee
has accommodated the SEC by stating in the Committee report:
The Committee emphasizes that the clear intent in 1995 and our continuing intent in
this legislation is that neither PSLRA nor S.1260 in any way alters the scienter stan-
dard in federal securities fraud suits.  It was the intent of Congress, as was expressly
stated during the legislative debate on the PSLRA, and particularly during the debate
on overriding the President’s veto, that the PSLRA establish a uniform federal stan-
dard on pleading requirements by adopting the pleading standard applied by the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals.
18
Thus, the Senate has made it clear that recklessness is sufficient to maintain
an action for fraud under the federal securities laws.  Some commentators have
suggested that this is an unusual process, to use the legislative history of one
statute to clarify Congress’ intent in adopting another statute and there have
been expressions of doubt as whether such a process will be binding upon the
courts.  Clearly a better procedure would have been to amend the Act.
This author is among those who believe that relief from the excesses of civil
securities litigation has been, and is still, sorely needed, but I believe the Act is
seriously flawed.  Literally enforced, the requirement for pleading with par-
ticularity “facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
the required state of mind” before discovery is permitted seriously hampers le-
gitimate plaintiffs.  Similarly, the safe harbor for forward-looking statements
may constitute not just a “safe harbor” but an impregnable fortress in which
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wrongdoers might take refuge.  To the extent that worthy plaintiffs are ham-
pered in securing an adequate remedy in the federal courts, the obvious and
most simple remedy is to amend the Act to eliminate or modify the provisions
that operate unfairly against meritorious plaintiffs.  However, this is undoubt-
edly an unrealistic expectation.  Even if the balance of power in Congress were
to shift, it is doubtful that Congress would revisit the Act so soon.  Moreover,
the Act passed in the Senate with a margin sufficient to overcome a Presiden-
tial veto.  Any foreseeable shift in that body undoubtedly would be insufficient
to adopt appropriate remedial legislation.
However, that does not close the debate.  Despite the relative newness of
the Act and the dearth of authoritative interpretations of it, a rush to preemp-
tion does seem unwarranted.  Apart from the deficiencies in the Act and the
argument that preemption is necessary to preserve the meritorious thrust of
Congress in enacting it, the question of preemption is a worthy one that should
be carefully considered, but on its merits apart from the Act.
In its simplest form, the case for preemption is that there is an inherent
logic, efficiency, and consistency in having litigation involving nationally traded
securities resolved in a single forum, with a single statute of limitations, a single
standard of proof, and a single set of substantive requirements.  The alternative
is fifty-plus definitions of scienter, fifty-plus statutes of limitations, fifty-plus
rules on attorneys’ fees, fifty-plus rules on what constitutes a class, fifty-plus
rules on standing, and conflict questions galore.  These considerations underlie
the preemptive provisions of the National Securities Markets Improvement
Act,19 which preempted most of the state authority over disclosure by compa-
nies with nationally traded securities and a number of other matters.
Of course, there are some meritorious arguments against preemption.  First,
there is the venerable Brandeisian observation that the states provide laborato-
ries for the nation:  Legal theories and approaches to litigation can be tested in
the state courts.  However, whatever value the states may have had as laborato-
ries for securities regulation, it long since has been realized and it is doubtful
whether further state experimentation is necessary or desirable.  Also, there is
the argument that the states should not be stripped of their power to litigate
wrongs committed against their citizens.  However, this argument would not
justify a nationwide class action being dealt with in a state court, the very issue
presently before the California Supreme Court.  Furthermore, these considera-
tions did not preclude the enactment of the National Securities Markets Im-
provement Act, which enjoyed considerable support and significantly circum-
scribed the power of states to protect their citizens against disclosure wrongs
and other securities misdeeds.  And, finally, there is the constitutional argu-
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ment.  I leave that to scholars better able to deal with it than I, such as Manning
Warren.20
Unfortunately, the realm of environmental law does not provide solace for
those opposing preemption.  The allocation of responsibility between the states
and the federal government in this area was the result of a very carefully con-
sidered and nicely defined allocation of responsibility.21  When the securities
acts were adopted in the early 1930s, they specifically reserved broad jurisdic-
tion to the states.  I would defer to Dean Seligman on matters of securities law
history, but it has always seemed to me that this was done, not because of any
burning desire to preserve the states as laboratories or as the result of a care-
fully considered allocation of responsibility, but rather because of a then-
common deference to state authority.  At that time, courts were far less willing
than they are presently to tolerate the intrusion of federal law into areas that
traditionally had been governed by state law.  After all, it was only a year after
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted that the Supreme Court de-
cided Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,22 which highlighted the contem-
porary judicial hesitancy to expand the authority of the federal government.  In
the Federal Securities Code, which sadly never was enacted, there was a more
considered allocation of jurisdiction between federal and state courts, much
like that which appears in today’s environmental laws.
One of the significant concerns expressed with regard to the pending legis-
lation that would provide for preemption is that it would preempt some desir-
able state litigation—desirable even in the eyes of the proponents of preemp-
tion—principally in Delaware, whose courts, because of the judicial climate and
their experience, have facilitated the completion of transactions and the protec-
tion of shareholders.  For instance, in tender offers and proxy contests involv-
ing one or more Delaware corporations, the Delaware courts have provided a
speedy and informed forum in which to resolve a variety of questions, some of
which parallel the sort of claims that may be asserted under federal securities
law.  This type of state jurisdiction should be preserved.  The Senate bill has
been amended to provide, in the words of the section-by-section analysis, “for
the preservation of certain law suits brought under State law affecting the con-
duct of corporate officers with respect to certain corporate actions, including
tender offers, exchange offers or the exercise of dissenter’s or appraisal rights.”
This summary seems to be somewhat narrower than the text of the bill itself.
With the SEC’s and the bar’s (particularly the Delaware bar’s) concerns having
been met and given the extent of sponsorship in the Senate, it is not surprising
that the legislation passed the Senate by a vote of 79 to 21.  The House Sub-
committee on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the Committee on Com-
merce held a hearing on H.R. 1689 on May 19, 1998.  With a majority of the
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House as co-sponsors, there is little doubt that this legislation will become law
during the current Congress.  The administration has evidenced support for it,
so a presidential veto is not in the cards.
The legislation will pass for all the wrong reasons and without the princi-
pled debate which the importance of the issue demands.  This outcome is un-
fortunate, but the argument for preemption is a compelling one on principle,
hence the outcome is not in any sense catastrophic or unduly rending of the
constitutional fabric.  There is indeed ample logic for focusing private litigation
involving nationally traded securities in the federal courts.  There is an old Por-
tuguese proverb, “God writes straight with crooked lines.”  This legislation may
be one of the instances in which that is true.
